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PRIVATE MEETINGS AND GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTIONS:
GULF & WESTERN MAY PROVIDE THE SEC NEW
TOOLS FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is a common law evidentiary rule that
protects from compelled disclosure the confidential communications be-
tween client and attorney made for the purpose of securing legal advice.'
The client, or the attorney on the client's behalf, may assert the
privilege in a wide range of legal proceedings to prevent disclosure of
written and oral confidential communications.2 The traditional rationale
for the privilege is that it encourages the client to communicate all rele-
vant facts to the attorney without fear of disclosure.' Consequently, the
client benefits from informed legal advice and society benefits from the
more effective administration of justice.4 Although some commentators
have suggested that the privilege may be an unnecessary obstacle to the
search for truth in legal proceedings,' courts consistently have held that
I See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950);
8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]; text accompanying note 31 infra (definitional elements of the attorney-client
privilege).
' See, e.g., In re. Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981)
(grand jury investigation); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1981) (IRS
investigation); United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700, 702-04 (8th Cir. 1971) (criminal trial),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 932 (1972); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314,
316 (7th Cir. 1963) (pre-trial civil discovery); McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937)
(SEC investigation); Sagorsky v. Malyon, 12 F.R.D. 486, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (civil trial).
' See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 424-25 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Control Group Test]. No empirical study yet has verified the proposition that the
attorney-client privilege encourages client communications that would not occur absent the
privilege. See Control Group Test, supra, at 425. The only empirical study to date that ad-
dresses the issue produced equivocal results. See Note, Functional Overlap Between the
Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doc-
trine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1262 (1962). In the study, only about half of the 108 laymen inter-
viewed believed that a court could not compel an attorney to disclose confidential com-
munications. Id. Also, only about half of the laymen indicated that they would be less likely
to make full disclosure to an attorney if the attorney subsequently could testify regarding
the disclosures. Id. One commentator has suggested that because potential clients cannot
predict whether the presence or absence of the privilege would affect their willingness to
disclose information to the attorney, the underlying assumption of the privilege is
unverifiable empirically. See Control Group Test, supra , at 425 & n.7.
See United States v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915); Simon, The
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 955 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Simon] (informed legal advice that results from attorney-client
privilege benefits society as well as client).
' See J. BENTHAM, 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 473-79 (Bowring ed. 1842); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 176 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)
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the social benefits deriving from the privilege outweigh the social costs.'
The Supreme Court recently stressed the important role the
privilege plays in encouraging attorney-client communication in the cor-
porate context.' The Court rejected the narrow "control group" test that
several federal circuit courts had adopted for determining the proper
scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege8 and instead endorsed a
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]; Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1056 (1975); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV. 447, 469-70 (1938) [hereinafter cited as The Scope of Privilege];
Nessen, Rethinking the Lawyer's Duties to Disclose Information: A Critique of Some of
Judge Frankel's Proposals, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 677, 707-10 (1979); Radin, The Privilege of
Confidential Communications between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487,491 (1928).
Probably the hostility toward the privilege stems from the realization that the privilege is a
device to cover-up evidence. Most clients are not likely to invoke the privilege unless they
have "dirty business" to hide from an adverse party in need of the evidence. See Hazard,
An.Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1062
(1978).
' See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322-24 (7th Cir.
1963); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950). The
official comment to Rule 210 of the Model Code of Evidence provides a succinct statement of
the position the courts have taken on the costs and benefits of the attorney-client privilege:
[T]he continued existence of the privilege is justified on grounds of social policy.
In a society as complicated in structure as ours and governed by laws as complex
and detailed as those imposed upon us, expert legal advice is essential. To the fur-
nishing of such advice the fullest freedom and honesty of communication of pertin-
ent facts is a prerequisite. To induce clients to make such communications, the
privilege to prevent their later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to
be a necessity. The social good derived from the proper performance of the func-
tions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweight the harm that
may come from suppression of the evidence in specific cases.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 210 comment (1942).
' See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-93 (1981). The Upjohn Court
noted that corporations, like individuals, need informed advice from counsel when legal prob-
lems arise. Id. at 392. The Upjohn Court added that corporations, unlike most individuals,
also need to consult frequently with legal counsel just to comply with the complex laws that
regulate every area of corporate activity. Id. The Court concluded that a properly defined
attorney-client privilege would ensure that corporate clients make full use of legal counsel
to resolve legal problems and comply with the. law. Id. at 389-93. See also Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege: A Look at Its Effect on the Corporate Client and the Corporate
Executive, 55 IND. L.J. 407, 408 n.10 (1980); Comment, A Securities Lawyer's Dilemma: The
SEC's Policy of Disclosure v. The Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 797, 797
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Lawyer's Dilemma].
8 See 449 U.S. at 390-93. The Upjohn Court noted that the first case to adopt a control
group test was City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D.
Pa.), mandamus denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1968). See 449 U.S. at 391. The City of Philadelphia court
held that the attorney-client privilege protected only the confidential communications be-
tween corporate counsel and members of the corporation's "control group." 210 F. Supp. at
485. The court defined "control group" as comprising the corporate employees who were "in
a position to control or even to take substantial part in a decision about any action which the
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney .... Id. Subsequent to the City of
Philadelphia decision, several federal circuit courts adopted the control group test. See
[Vol. 39:12251226
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broader privilege.' In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision to ex-
pand the corporate privilege, however, the recent district court decision
in SEC v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc."0 may diminish dramatically
the value of the attorney-client privilege to a corporation under in-
vestigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)." In Gulf
& Western, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
implicitly endorsed a SEC investigatory procedure that in certain in-
stances may reduce the ability of a corporation to protect confidential
attorney-client communications from unauthorized disclosure and subse-
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 449
U.S. 383, 402 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1235-36 (3d Cir.
1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968).
In Upjohn the Supreme Court rejected the control group test because the test did not
encourage lower-level employees to give corporate attorneys the information needed to form-
ulate effective legal advice. 449 U.S. at 392. The Upjohn Court also observed that the con-
trol group test led to unpredictable results and did not provide corporate clients clear
guidelines on whether the privilege would protect given disclosures by corporate employees
to counsel. Id. at 393. The Court stated that "if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege
is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty
whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege ... is little better
than no privilege at all." Id.
' See 449 U.S. at 394-97. The majority in Upjohn refused to fashion or adopt expressly
an alternative test to the control group test. See id. at 396-97. Rather, the Court pointed to
certain facts in Upjohn that warranted extending the privilege to protect the communica-
tions between corporate counsel and non-control group employees:
(1) Non-control group employees made the communications to corporate counsel
at the direction of corporate superiors for the purpose of securing legal advice;
(2) the communications concerned matters within the scope of the employees' cor-
porate duties;
(3) the employees knew that corporate counsel sought their disclosures in order to
provide the corporation legal advice;
(4) the corporation considered the communications confidential when made and
subsequently had kept the communications confidential.
Id. at 395-97. Commentators have noted that although the Upjohn Court refused expressly
to adopt a formal alternative test to the control group test, the Court appeared to have ap-
plied the subject matter test employed in Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596,
609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). See Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporate Clients, 15 AKRON L. REV. 119, 129-30 (1981); Note, The Implications of Upjohn,
56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 887, 892-94 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Implications]. Regardless of
whether the Upjohn Court implicitly endorsed the subject matter test or provided the
rough guidelines for a new test, the important fact is that the Court elected to expand the
scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context beyond the narrow confines of
the control group approach. See Implications, supra, at 894; Companies Win Broader
Attorney-Client Privilege, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 3.
10 502 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1980), motion to strike granted, 518 F. Supp. 675 (D.D.C.
1981).
" See Pickholz, 'Gulf & Western' May Shake Attorney-Client Privilege, Legal Times
of Wash., Aug. 24, 1981, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Pickholz]; Vilkin, Fedders: New Look at
the SEC, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 25, 1982, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Vilkin]. Gulf & Western may
also provide other governmental agencies a basis for attacking the corporate attorney-client
privilege. See text accompanying note 115 infra.
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quent use in legal proceedings.'2 In addition, the court proposed in dicta
the creation of a new exception to the attorney-client privilege that
would permit the SEC to pierce the privilege whenever the Commission
could demonstrate good cause to justify disclosure of confidential infor-
mation.'"
In Gulf & Western, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action
against Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. (Gulf & Western) and two of the
corporation's top officers. 4 Alleging that the defendants violated several
federal securities laws, the SEC sought a permanent injunction to enjoin
future violations." The defendants filed an affirmative defense urging
the district court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that SEC in-
vestigators had breached Gulf & Western's attorney-client privilege."
12 See text accompanying notes 19-24, 52-59 infra.
, See text accompanying notes 48-51 infra.
1 See 502 F. Supp. at 344. In Gulf & Western, the two officers named in the SEC's
complaint were Charles Bluhdorn, Gulf & Western's chief executive officer, and Don F.
Gaston, an executive vice-president. Id.
5 See 518 F. Supp. at 677 n.2. The SEC's complaint in Gulf & Western charged the
defendants with violating, over a seven year period, § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), §§ 10(b), 13(a), 13(d) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78m(d), 78n(a) (1976), and various rules, including rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). The district court did not provide background information regard-
ing the specific facts underlying the various charges. The New York Times, however,
published a series of articles on the SEC's investigation of Gulf & Western that provide
some factual background. See SEC Pressed Wide Investigation of Gulf and Western Con-
glomerate, N.Y. Times, July 24-26, 1977, at p. 1.
16 See 502 F. Supp. at 344-47; text accompanying notes 19-29 infra (discussion of Gulf &
Western's claim that SEC breached attorney-client privilege). In addition to the affirmative
defense alleging breach of the attorney-client privilege, Gulf & Western originally argued
that the court should dismiss the complaint for six additional reasons. First, Gulf & Western
charged the SEC with deliberately leaking the results of the Gulf & Western investigation
to the New York Times. See 502 F. Supp. at 346. The defendants maintained that publica-
tion of the information did irreparable harm to the defendants' reputation and amounted to
summary punishment without the due process guarantees of the fifth amendment. Id. at
346-47. Although the district court questioned whether the defendants' claim regarding the
press leaks had merit, the court permitted the defendants to pursue limited discovery. Id. at
347 & n.7. Subsequently, the district court dismissed the affirmative defense on the ground
that the defendants had not proven the press leaks had come from SEC staff members. See
518 F. Supp. at 685-86.
Gulf & Western's next three affirmative defenses were related to the attorney-client
privilege defense. See 502 F. Supp. at 347-48. Gulf & Western claimed that because the SEC
had breached the corporation's privilege, the court should dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the balance of equities weighed against any injunction in favor of the SEC,
that dismissal would serve to deter similar SEC violations in the future, and that the doc-
trine of unclean hands barred the SEC from obtaining injunctive relief. See id. The district
court, however, noted that the three defenses were redundant and added little to the breach
of the attorney-client privilege defense. Id. at 348. The court, therefore, granted the SEC's
motion to strike the three defenses. Id.
Gulf & Western also argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel precluded the SEC
from challenging the legality of certain accounting practices since the SEC had failed to ob-
ject to the practices in the past. Id. The district court rejected the equitable estoppel
defense on the ground that a party may only raise the doctrine against the government to
[Vol. 39:1225
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Subsequently, the SEC filed a motion to strike the affirmative defense.17
The district court, however, reserved judgment on the motion to strike
until Gulf & Western had an opportunity in discovery to prove a breach
of the attorney-client privilege."8
The alleged breach of Gulf & Western's attorney-client privilege oc-
curred during a series of meetings between SEC investigators and Gulf
& Western's former outside general counsel, Joel Dolkart.'9 Dolkart met
with SEC investigators on numerous occasions over a twelve month
period to discuss his knowledge of certain illegal corporate activities."0
Dolkart agreed to the meetings as part of a plea bargain agreement he
negotiated with prosecutors after a New York grand jury indicted him
for embezzling funds from his law firm." The SEC investigators met
with Dolkart in private and, contrary to normal practice, did not record
or otherwise formally preserve Dolkart's testimony.2 The SEC-Dolkart
meetings continued even after Gulf & Western's counsel wrote and ob-
jected to the meetings." Subsequent to these meetings, the SEC filed
the civil enforcement action against the defendants. 4
Since the SEC made no transcript of Dolkart's interviews, Gulf &
Western's discovery consisted of deposing the SEC staff members who
prevent an "egregious injustice." Id. The court concluded that requiring Gulf & Western to
change certain accounting practices did not reach the level of injustice necessary for the
estoppel doctrine to apply. Id.
Finally, Gulf & Western argued the doctrine of laches. Id. The district court rejected
the laches defense on the ground that the doctrine does not apply when governmental agen-
cies are investigating in the public interest. Id. Moreover, the court noted that the complex-
ity of the Gulf & Western case required a lengthy investigation. Id.
7 See 502 F. Supp. at 345.
,S See id. at 345-47.
, See 518 F. Supp. at 678-79, 684. The court in Gulf & Western noted that, prior to
meeting with SEC investigators, Joel Dolkart had served as outside general counsel to Gulf
& Western for 16 years. Id. at 678. In addition, Dolkart had served as a director, secretary,
and member of the corporation's pension advisory committee during the period of time
covered by the SEC investigation. Id. Dolkart had resigned as general counsel to Gulf &
Western two years before meeting with SEC investigators. See 502 F. Supp. at 347 n.6; 518
F. Supp. at 678.
See 518 F. Supp. at 678.
21 See id. The Gulf & Western court noted that a New York grand jury had indicted
Dolkart for embezzling more than $2.5 million in fees that Gulf & Western had paid
Dolkart's law firm for his legal services. Id. In addition, the grand jury charged Dolkart
with embezzling a half million dollars directly from Gulf & Western. Id. To avoid imprison-
ment, Dolkart entered a written plea agreement to provide New York prosecutors and the
SEC information he possessed on corporate misconduct. Id. A New York court provisionally
sentenced Dolkart to an indeterminate sentence carrying a maximum penalty of three
years. Id. Final sentencing was to occur after Dolkart cooperated with investigators. Id.
Dolkart ultimately received a five year term of probation. Id. at 679.
' See id. at 682, 684; text accompanying note 42 infra (discussion of reasons for SEC's
failure to transcribe interviews with Gulf & Western's outside counsel).
n See 518 F. Supp. at 684. In response to Gulf & Western's letter protesting the
Dolkart interviews, the SEC invited Gulf & Western to supply additional evidence relevant
to the investigation. Id. Gulf & Western did not respond to the request. Id.
" See id. at 677; note 15 supra (discussion of SEC complaint).
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had participated in the investigation and analyzing their notes.25 From
these sources, Gulf & Western identified and submitted to the court
numerous instances where Dolkart purportedly disclosed privileged in-
formation to the SEC.26 In addition, Gulf & Western charged the SEC
with deliberately adopting an investigatory procedure that prevented
the corporation from protecting its rights under the attorney-client
privilege." The corporation proposed that under the circumstances the
court should shift the burden of proof to the SEC to show that the Com-
mission did not violate Gulf & Western's attorney-client privilege.'
Finally, Gulf & Western argued that if the court allowed the suit to con-
tinue, the court in effect would be encouraging other corporate at-
torneys to bargain away their client's confidences in secret meetings
with the SEC when the disclosure served the attorneys' self-interest.'
The district court preceded the analysis of Gulf & Western's claims
with a brief review of the federal common law on the attorney-client
privilege.2 The court noted that the privilege only protects confidential
attorney-client communications made for the express purpose of receiv-
ing legal advice.2 The court added that under common law Gulf &
Western had the burden of proving that the privilege protected any
See 518 F. Supp. at 682, 684.
26 See id. at 682-84. The Gulf & Western court observed that of the nine purported in-
stances of breach that Gulf & Western submitted to the court only one instance directly
related to the SEC's complaint. Id.
I See id. at 684. The defendants in Gulf & Western claimed that the SEC intentionally
met with Dolkart in private, unrecorded meetings so that the defendants would be unable to
prove whether or not Dolkart disclosed privileged information. Id. To support the claim that
the SEC intended to breach the privilege, the defendants pointed to Dolkart's deposition
testimony. Id. Dolkart had stated in his deposition that he personally never had a discussion
with SEC staff members regarding the privilege nor did he ever refuse to answer a ques-
tion because of the privilege. Id. The defendants also emphasized that the failure to
transcribe the Dolkart interviews was not a routine practice. Id.
See id. at 683, 684 n.11, 686.
See id. at 686.
See id. at 680-82. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs the application of the
attorney-client privilege in federal courts. See FED. R. EvID. 501. Rule 501 instructs federal
courts hearing cases involving federal law to apply the privilege according to "the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience." Id.
" See 518 F. Supp. at 681. In reviewing the federal common law, the Gulf & Western
court cited the test for determining when the privilege protects an attorney-client com-
munication provided in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
(D. Mass. 1950):
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort, and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
[Vol. 39:12251230
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disclosure Dolkart made to the SEC.2 In reviewing several of the pur-
ported instances of breach, the Gulf & Western court held that Dolkart
did not violate the privilege in disclosing information he had received
while acting in his non-lawyer roles of director, member of the corpora-
tion's pension committee, or executive assistant to the corporation's
chief executive officer.3 The court also held that Dolkart legitimately
could disclose information he had received while acting as a "mere
scrivener"' or while giving a corporate officer "business advice." 5 Finally,
Id.; see also WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554 (alternative definition of attorney-client
privilege).
' See 518 F. Supp. at 682. The federal courts consistently place the burden of proof on
the party claiming the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207,
213 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena (Horowitz), 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Osterneck v.
E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 81, 85 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Lipshy, 492 F.
Supp. 35, 41 (N.D. Tex. 1979). The party claiming the privilege has the burden of proof for
two reasons. First, the party claiming the privilege possesses the underlying facts
necessary to prove the essential elements of the privilege. See FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32,
37 (7th Cir. 1980). Second, by placing the burden of proof on the party claiming the privilege,
the courts prevent abuse of the privilege. See Kobak, The Uneven Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339, 340
(1972).
1 See 518 F. Supp. at 683. The court in Gulf & Western noted that the attorney-client
privilege only protects communications between attorney and client when the attorney is
acting in his professional capacity as the client's attorney. Id. The "acting in a professional
capacity" requirement is a basic element of the attorney-client privilege. See WIGMORE,
supra note 1, § 2292, at 554. When an attorney for a corporation not only acts as a legal ad-
visor, but also plays a managerial role, the courts have looked closely to see which role the
attorney was playing when he received the confidential communication. See, e.g., Young v.
Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1972) (attorney-business associate not acting as at-
torney); United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 40-41 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (attorney-corporate
executive acting as attorney); R.C.A. v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1955)
(attorney-negotiator not acting as attorney); United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 52 F.
Supp. 751, 753 (D. Del. 1943) (attorney-director not acting as attorney). Commentators have
observed that courts respond skeptically to assertions of the privilege when the attorney
serves the corporation in multiple roles. See O'Neal & Thompson, Vulnerability of
Professional-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1775, 1794 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as O'Neal]; Schaefer, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Modern
Business Corporation, 20 Bus. LAW. 989, 995 (1965); Simon, supra note 4, at 969. One court
recently expressed the skepticism in unusually graphic language: "When the attorney and
the client get in bed together as business partners, their relationship is a business relation-
ship, not a professional one, and their confidences are business confidences unprotected by a
professional privilege." Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 546
(D. Nev. 1972).
' See 518 F. Supp. at 683. The court in Gulf & Western noted that Dolkart received in-
formation regarding a proposed tender offer while his law firm was acting as a "scrivener"
and another law firm was providing the legal advice. Id. Where an attorney is performing a
task that does not require legal analysis, such as merely drafting a deed without also giving
legal advice, the attorney-client privilege does not protect the client's disclosures. See
Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 81, 86 (N.D. Ga 1979); WIGMORE, supra
note 1, § 2296, at 567 (collecting cases); MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 88, at 179-80. The Gulf &
Western court did not indicate precisely the task Dolkart was performing as "scrivener"
during the tender offer transaction. See 518 F. Supp. at 683.
1 See 518 F. Supp. at 683. The Gulf & Western court observed that advice Dolkart
123119821
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the court in Gulf & Western held that Dolkart did not breach the
privilege in disclosing certain information that the corporation also had
disclosed to third parties36 or in public documents." The district court,
therefore, concluded that Gulf & Western had not proved breach of the
attorney-client privilege.
3 8
The Gulf & Western court found no basis for the defendants' claim
that the SEC had conducted an improper investigation. The court noted
approvingly that the SEC investigators had informed Dolkart's attorney
at the outset that the SEC would rely on Dolkart to preserve the con-
fidentiality of privileged communications." Moreover, the district court
referred to Dolkart's testimony in which he claimed to have avoided
disclosing many privileged matters during the SEC interviews.4 Finally,
the Gulf & Western court refused to place much weight on the SEC's
gave a Gulf & Western manager about the advisability of purchasing certain securities was
of a business and not legal nature. Id. The attorney-client privilege does not protect com-
munications between an attorney and client that deal predominately with business matters.
See Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1981); In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89
F.R.D. 595, 601 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del.
1977); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 517 (D. Conn. 1976); Eutectic Corp. v. Met-
co, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950. Commentators have suggested that the distinction between
business and legal advice is vague and subject to sematic manipulation by the courts. See
Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV. 899, 918 n.83 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Weissenberger];
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitle-
ment, 91 HARV. L. REV., 464, 471 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fixed Rules].
' See 518 F. Supp. at 683. The Gulf & Western court noted that any voluntary
disclosure by the corporation to a third party outside the corporation destroys the confiden-
tiality necessary for an attorney-client privilege claim. Id. Accord Permian Corp. v. United
States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (disclosure to SEC destroys confidentiality);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Horowitz), 482 F.2d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1973) (disclosure to account-
ant destroys confidentiality); SEC v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,945 (D.D.C. 1979) (disclosure to investment banker destroys con-
fidentiality).
See 518 F. Supp. at 683. The court in Gulf & Western observed that information
which Gulf & Western had disclosed or intended to disclose in public documents was not
privileged. Id. Accord United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d' 106, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1970); SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (1976);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. .Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950). But cf. SEC
v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,945 (D.D.C.
1979) (preliminary drafts of documents corporate attorney intends to release only after fur-
ther review are privileged).
See 518 F. Supp. at 684.
See id. at 686; text accompanying note 27 supra.
" See 518 F. Supp. at 684.
4 See id. Dolkart testified in Gulf & Western that he avoided breaching the privilege
by holding back privileged information during the interviews and by excluding from discus-
sion certain privileged topics prior to the interviews. Id. As a further indication that no
breach occurred, the Gulf & Western court pointed out that after Gulf & Western protested
against the interviews, SEC staff members met to consider whether Dolkart had disclosed




failure to record the Dolkart interviews, even though the omission was a
departure from normal investigatory procedures.42
Since the district court concluded that the defendants had failed to
prove either a breach of the attorney-client privilege or an improperly
conducted SEC investigation, the court granted the SEC's motion to
strike Gulf & Western's affirmative defense. 3 In addition, the court re-
jected Gulf & Western's request to shift the burden of proof to the
SEC." The district court emphasized that the Commission had
cooperated in good faith during Gulf & Western's extensive discovery. 5
The Gulf & Western court indicated, however, that the court's decision
in favor of the SEC represented only approval of the SEC's investigation
and not approval of Dolkart's plea agreement. 6 The district court ex-
pressly rejected Gulf & Western's argument that a decision in favor of
the SEC would have a chilling effect on future attorney-client com-
munications.
7
Finally, the court added in dicta that even if Dolkart had disclosed
privileged information to the SEC, the Commission still might
demonstrate good cause to justify the disclosure. 8 The Gulf & Western
court noted that the SEC's mission is to protect the public interest and
the interest of shareholders. 9 The district court suggested that when
the SEC's need for evidence clashes with a corporation's attorney-client
privilege, a court should employ a balance test to determine whether the
" See id. To support the conclusion that the SEC had not departed intentionally from
standard procedure in not recording the Dolkart interviews, the Gulf & Western court
referred to the testimony of several SEC investigators. Id. One investigator testified that
the normal procedure of recording investigatory interviews was not an ironclad rule. Id.
The investigator admitted having conducted several such unrecorded interviews during the
Gulf & Western investigation. Id. The court also observed that several other staff members
had conducted similar informal interviews without perserving the witnesses' statements.
Id. The Gulf & Western court apparently concluded that since SEC staff members may
depart from normal procedure on occasion when certain unspecified conditions exist, the
SEC did not act in bad faith in failing to record the numerous Dolkart interviews. See id.
The court did not specify anywhere in the opinion any reasons why the SEC investigators
elected to conduct numerous interviews with an important informant like Dolkart without
recording the sessions. Nor does the court explain why the SEC after receiving a protest
from Gulf & Western regarding the meetings, see supra note 41, did not decide to record
the remaining interviews in the event that the privilege issue arose in subsequent litigation.
See 518 F. Supp. 678-86.
'3 See 518 F. Supp. at 684.
" See id.
'5 See id. at 686. The court in Gulf & Western pointed out that the defendants had failed
to prove their case despite more than 4000 pages of testimony and 200 exhibits. Id. The
court concluded that the defendants had failed to prove their case solely because the SEC
had not breached Gulf & Western's attorney-client privilege. Id.
4 See id.
4? See id.; text accompanying notes 52-75 infra (discussion of problems with SEC in-
vestigation and adverse effect on attorney-client privilege).
' See 518 F. Supp. at 686.
" See id.
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SEC's need to know outweighs the corporation's need to protect its con-
fidences ° Since the court found no breach of Gulf & Western's privilege,
however, the court refused to decide whether the SEC could show good
cause for piercing the corporation's privilege.
5 1
Contrary to the court's conclusion in Gulf & Western, judicial ap-
proval of the SEC's method of investigating Gulf & Western could have
a chilling effect on the corporate attorney-client privilege.2 The purpose
of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage attorney-client com-
munication. 3 The privilege encourages communication by assuring the
client that the attorney will not disclose the client's confidential com-
munications without the client's authorization. 4 The attorney normally
has strong incentives to preserve the client's confidences. When the at-
torney, however, faces imprisonment if he fails to comply fully with
zealous government investigators who desire insider information on cor-
porate wrongdoing, the incentives to disclose may be stronger than the
incentives to protect the client's confidences. 6 Under these conditions,
most corporate clients would place little faith in either the attorney or
government investigators to preserve the client's privileged communica-
tions. Judicial approval of an investigatory practice that encourages the
unauthorized disclosure of privileged attorney-client communications in-
troduces an element of distrust into the corporate attorney-client rela-
tionship and may discourage corporate clients in the future from divulg-
ing all relevant matters to their corporate counsel. At the least,
therefore, the Gulf & Western court should have criticized the SEC for
meeting with Dolkart in private without a representative of Gulf &
Western present to defend the corporation's rights. 7
' See id. The Gulf & Western court cited no authority to support the proposition that
courts should employ a balance test when the SEC seeks to obtain a corporation's privileged
communications. See id.; text accompanying notes 76-118 infra (discussion of the balance
test approach to attorney-client privilege).
"' See 518 F. Supp. at 584.
2 See Pickholz, supra note 11, at 17.
See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128
U.S. 464, 470 (1888); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir.
1967); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956; Robinson v. United
States, 144 F.2d 392, 405 (6th Cir. 1944); WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2324-2325, at 632.
See Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the
Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 235, 249-52 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Lawyer-Client Privilege]. Personal integrity, loyalty to the client, and
professional ethics normally motivate an attorney to maintain a client's confidences. Id. In
addition, the possibility of a civil suit for damages and disbarment are negative sanctions
that compel an attorney to observe the attorney-client privilege. Id. See also R. WEINBERG,
CONFIDENTIAL AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS 16 (1967); Callan & David, Professional Respon-
sibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary
System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 340 n.40 (1976).




Similarly, the Gulf & Western court should have criticized the SEC's
failure to record or transcribe the Dolkart interviews. Gulf & Western
faced an unreasonably burdensome task in trying to prove a breach of
the privilege without a formal transcript of the Dolkart interviews. 8
Dolkart's testimony and the SEC investigators' testimony and notes
could not provide Gulf & Western a precise and reliable evidentiary base
from which to prove that Dolkirt disclosed privileged information.
Arguably, Gulf & Western's failure to prove a breach resulted from the
SEC's failure to provide an adequate record of the interviews and not
because Dolkart and the SEC had respected the corporation's privilege.'9
Since the potential for abuse of the privilege is so great, the courts
should consider, if confronted with a case similar to Gulf & Western in
the future, imposing some restrictions on the SEC. One commentator in
discussing Gulf & Western has suggested that the corporate client
should have the opportunity to send a legal representative to the SEC's
investigatory interviews with the client's attorney in every case where
the attorney faces adverse legal consequences upon failure to cooperate
fully with the SEC." Other alternative safeguards would include requir-
ing SEC investigators to record the interviews or requiring the attorney
to convey evidence only by written affidavit."' In those cases where the
SEC failed to employ any safeguards, and the corporate client could
show that the attorney faced adverse legal consequences if he failed to
cooperate fully with the SEC, the courts should shift the burden to the
SEC to prove that no breach of the attorney-client privilege actually oc-
curred. 2 The SEC could meet the burden of proof by demonstrating that
the attorney had received the information he later disclosed while not
" See text accompanying notes 27 & 42 supra. The Gulf & Western court failed to
note that the normal policy considerations that have led courts to place the burden of proof
on the party claiming the privilege did not apply to the facts in Gulf & Western. See note 32
supra. Normally, when a party claims the privilege, the court has no way to determine the
validity of the claim unless the claiming party provides some proof to substantiate the,
claim. Since the claiming party possesses all the underlying facts to support the claim of
privilege, the court acts reasonably in placing the proof burden on the claiming party. In
Gulf & Western, however, the defendants were not asserting the privilege from behind a
corporate wall of secrecy. Rather, the defendants were asserting a breach of the privilege
by others. Furthermore, the defendants lacked adequate proof of the underlying facts to
support the claim of breach. On fairness grounds alone, therefore, the Gulf & Western court
should have modified the normal proof requirements.
" Contra 518 F. Supp. at 686.
See Pickholz, supra note 11, at 17.
61 See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1192-95 (2d Cir.
1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975). In Meyerhofer, an attorney filed a written affidavit
with the SEC after becoming concerned that his client's registration statement failed to
disclose essential information. Id. at 1192-93. A judicially imposed rule requiring the SEC to
preserve the testimony of attorney-witnesses by recordings, transcripts, or affidavits,
would be no great burden since the SEC's normal procedure is to transcribe such interviews
anyway. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
6 See 518 F. Supp. at 684 n.11; text accompanying notes 27-28, 44-45 supra.
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acting in a confidential legal relationship with the client. 3 In addition,
the SEC might justify receiving confidential information under either
the crime-fraud 4 or self-defense', exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege. Finally, the SEC could produce for in camera review proof
that the Commission had received certain insider information from an in-
dependent source unrelated to any breach of the attorney-client
privilege.6
A difficult issue to resolve is what remedies should apply if the SEC
could not prove the absence of breach or the SEC acknowledged that the
attorney had disclosed privileged information. The Gulf & Western
court, by finding that Dolkart had not breached the corporation's
privilege, did not reach the issue of appropriate remedies for breach of
I See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra (discussion of essential elements of
attorney-client privilege).
" See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). If the client consults an attorney
for advice to use in the furtherance of crime or fraud, the attorney-client privilege will not
protect the communications. Id. The party seeking the communication, however, must make
a prima facie showing that the criminal or fraudulent activity occurred subsequent to the
legal consultation to justify piercing the privilege. Id.; In re Grand Jury (Fine), 641 F.2d 199,
203 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d
37, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1939); United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 527 (D. Del. 1981); SEC v.
Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.D.C. 1948), modified in part, 184 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
vacated as moot and remanded for dismissal, 340 U.S. 908 (1951). Commentators have sug-
gested that the SEC can use the crime-fraud exception to pierce a corporation's privilege in
most cases involving a past violation of the securities laws, since the failure to disclose past
violations in current or future disclosure documents may be an on-going fraudulent act. See
2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503-68 n.6 (1981); Hoffman, On Lear-
ning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud- The Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389,
1390-1420 (1978); Myers, The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional
Responsibility: Suggested Attorney Liability for Breach of Duty to Disclose Fraud to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113, 1113-1144 [hereinafter
cited as Myers]; Lawyer's Dilemma, supra note 7, at 797-814; Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 326-31
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Shareholder Litigation].
" See Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1125 (1975). Under the self defense exception, if the client or a third party brings civil or
criminal charges against the attorney for wrongdoing in connection with the attorney's at-
tempt to serve the client, the attorney can disclose privileged communication in his own
defense. See id.; Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1192-95 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1975); United States v. Amrep Corp., 418 F. Supp. 473,
474 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See generally, Levine, Self-Interest or Self-Defense: Lawyer Disregard
of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV., 783 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Levine]; Lawyer's Dilemma, supra note 7, at 808; Note, 29 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 376, 383 (1975). If, for example, in Gulf & Western the SEC's complaint named Dolkart
as an aider and abettor in the securities violations, Dolkart could disclose confidential infor-
mation that demonstrated his innocence.
" See 518 F. Supp. at 684 n.11. The Gulf & Western court rejected the defendants'
argument that the court should require the SEC to prove insider information came from an
independent source. Id. The district court, however, may have followed the suggestion if the
court had decided that the SEC breached Gulf & Western's attorney-client privilege.
1236 [Vol. 39:1225
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
the privilege. 7 If the court, however, had found Dolkart provided con-
fidential information that the SEC subsequently used in the investiga-
tion, the court would have had to consider what evidence if any the SEC
could submit at trial."8 Clearly, under the common law attorney-client
privilege, Gulf & Western could prevent Dolkart from testifying at trial
regarding privileged matters he earlier had disclosed to the SEC.69 If the
SEC's complaint rested solely on Dolkart's privileged testimony, then
the court presumably would dismiss the complaint.
While the corporation could prevent the attorney from testifying at
trial concerning privileged matters, uncertainty exists over whether the
corporation could prevent other evidence from being admitted that the
SEC acquired as a result of the attorney's unauthorized disclosure of
privileged communications. The federal courts have not resolved the
issue of whether a court should exclude evidence from an independent
source that the government would not have discovered but for the
breach of the attorney-client privilege.70 In the criminal area, the courts
use the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to prohibit the government
from using unconstitutionally seized evidence as the basis for discover-
ing admissible evidence." The attorney-client privilege, however, does
not protect a constitutional right," and no federal court yet has applied
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in a case involving a violation of
the privilege.
7 1
Although the attorney-client privilege does not protect a constitu-
tional right, courts consistently have emphasized the crucial role the
privilege plays in the overall administration of justice. 4 Without some
type of exclusionary rule, nothing would deter the SEC and other
governmental agencies from soliciting privileged information from an at-
torney willing to breach the client's confidences and then using the
privileged information to obtain admissible evidence. The SEC would
benefit from information that the attorney only obtained because the
67 See text accompanying notbs'33-43 siipra.
See 502 F. Supp. at 346-47.
69 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D.
Minn. 1979); WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2325 at 632-33.
70 See, e.g., United States v. Fanning, 477 F.2d 45, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 519-32 (D. Del. 1981); United States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1070,
1073-84 (D. Minn. 1979); SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1039-40 (N.D. Tex. 1979); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869-70 (D. Minn. 1979);
OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
7 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 339 (1939). The purpose of judicially created exclusionary rules of
evidence, such as the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, is to deter the government from
violating basic constitutional rights. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446, 454-55
(1976).
See OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
's See cases in note 70 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
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client believed the privilege prevented subsequent unauthorized
disclosure. Clearly, an attorney-client privilege that does not bar the
derivative use of improperly disclosed privileged information is a weak
privilege indeed and would not provide the protection necessary to en-
courage attorney-client communications. Therefore, the courts should
consider exercising their supervisory powers in cases similar to Gulf &
Western to suppress any evidence that derives from a breach of the
attorney-client privilege. 5 Applying an exclusionary rule, such as the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, in a Gulf & Western-type case would
protect the corporation's attorney-client privilege and deter the SEC
from encouraging corporate counsel to disclose the corporation's con-
fidential communications.
While the Gulf & Western court's decision may have a chilling effect
on corporate attorney-client communications, the court's discussion of a
good cause exception to the attorney-client privilege in favor of the SEC
could destroy completely the value of the privilege for corporate
clients.", In essence, the good cause exception would permit the courts to
employ a balance test in specific cases to determine whether the benefits
of disclosure outweighed the benefits of preserving the privilege. The
balance test approach to the attorney-client privilege differs con-
siderably from the traditional common law approach." Under the com-
mon law, the courts consider whether particular communications be-
tween a corporate client and attorney fall within the narrowly con-
structed definition of the attorney-client privilege78 or within one of the
numerous exceptions. 9 Under the common law, once a court determines
that the privilege protects a given communication, the protection is ab-
solute no matter how great the evidentiary needs of the party seeking
" Cf. SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 312-318 (5th Cir. 1981) (federal courts
should use supervisory power to prevent government agencies from using evidence obtained
by fraud, deceit, or trickery); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530, 533-34 (7th Cir.
1968) (federal courts should suppress evidence government knowingly receives from a thief).
Although neither ESM nor Knoll Associates involved violations of the attorney-client
privilege, in both cases the court held that a government agency may not introduce
evidence in civil proceedings that the agency obtained by improper means. See ESM, 645
F.2d at 312-18; Knoll Associates, 397 F.2d at 533-34. Similar logic should apply when a
government agency solicits privileged information from an attorney.
7' See 518 F. Supp. at 686; Pickholz, supra note 11, at 17.
" See generally Fixed Rules, supra note 35, at 464-77.
7' See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick
Indus., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 81, 85 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 545-46 (D. Nev. 1972); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950); text accompanying note 31 supra (definitional elements
of attorney-client privilege).
" See Note, The A ttorney-Client Privilege-Identifying the Corporate Client, 48 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 1281, 1302 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Identifying the Client]; Note, The Cor-
poration Attorney-Client Privilege: Culpable Employees, Attorney Ethics, and the Joint
Defense Doctrine, 58 TEX. L. REV. 809, 823 (1980); text accompanying notes 33-37, 64-65
supra (discussion of exceptions to attorney-client privilege).
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disclosure of the communication." Proponents of the common law ap-
proach claim that the traditional privilege provides the attorney and
client a necessary degree of certainty regarding the communications
that the privilege will protect." The proponents warn that the alter-
native balance test approach would give the courts too much unguided
discretion and would deprive corporations of fixed standards for deter-
mining prospectively. whether the privilege will protect the
corporation's confidential communications with legal counsel.2 Conse-
quently, the common law proponents predict that the balance test ap-
proach, by creating the possibility of forced disclosure upon a showing of
good cause, would chill significantly attorney-client communication. 3
Opponents of the common law approach, on the other hand, argue
that the traditional approach unduly neglects any good cause reasons
the discovering party may have to justify disclosure of the adverse party's
attorney-client communications." One opponent has argued that the
traditional privilege is an outdated evidentiary rule which is contrary to
the liberal policies of discovery that now exist.8 Another opponent of the
traditional privilege has argued that the common law approach in reality
does not provide corporations the clear guidelines necessary to justify a
fixed rule approach. Therefore, the opponents assert that any chilling
of the attorney-client relationship that results from the adoption of the
" See Blbck & Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Maintaining the Confident-
iality of a Corporate Client's Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35 Bus. LAW. 5,
17 (1979); Control Group Test, supra note 3, at 425-26.
" See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). In Upjohn, the Supreme
Court emphasized that an effective attorney-client privilege must possess clear and predict-
able guidelines. Id.; supra note 8 (control group test rejected for not providing clear and
predictable guidelines).
8 See Pickholz, supra note 11, at 17; Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 918; Control
Group Test, supra note 3, at 426; Shareholder Litigation, supra note 64, at 313.
" See Pickholz, supra note 11, at 17; Weissenberger, supra note 35, at 918;
Shareholder Litigation, supra note 64, at 313 & n.53, 321-22.
" See MCCoRMICK, supra note 5, § 87, at 176-77; Fixed Rules, supra note 35, at 464-77;
Identifying the Client, supra note 79, at 1305-07; Lawyer-Client Privilege, supra note 55, at
257-59.
See The Scope of the Privilege, supra note 5, at 469-70.
See Fixed Rules, supra note 35, at 470-71, 473-75. The student commentator in Fix-
edRules pointed to six sources of ambiguity that preclude a corporation from ever knowing
with certainty whether a court will find that the attorney-client privilege protects par-
ticular communications with counsel. Id. The commentator noted that:
(1) the distinction between legal and business advice is vague and a court may
manipulate the distinction in a given case to reach a desired result;
(2) the distinction between an on-going crime and a past crime similarly is vague
and subject to manipulation;
(3) a court may find that the corporation did not intend the communication with
counsel to be confidential;
(4) a court may find that the corporation lost the privilege by disclosing the con-
fidential communications to too many corporate employees or to outsiders;
(5) neither the control group nor the subject matter test contain clear guidelines
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balance test alternative will be outweighed by the benefits that accrue
from a freer discovery process.
Although a few state courts have adopted the balance test approach
as a general rule to apply in privilege cases,88 the federal courts have
treated the balance test as an exception to the traditional approach that
should be employed only in certain narrow situations.89 The landmark
case in this area is Garner v. Wolfinbarger In Garner, the Fifth Circuit
held that shareholders in a combined derivative-class action suit against
their corporation may pierce the corporation's attorney-client privilege
for good cause." The Garner court reasoned that corporate management
owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders to manage the corporation for
for determining when the privilege will protect given corporate employee-
attorney communications; and
(6) since a corporation may do business in multiple jurisdictions with different
privilege rules, the corporation cannot predict which privilege rules will apply
in a given civil suit.
Id.
'7 See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 87, at 176-77; Levine, supra note 65, at 817; Fixed
Rules, supra note 35, at 464-77; Identifying the Client, supra note 79, at 1305-07; Lawyer-
Client Privilege, supra note 55, at 257-59.
" See In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 243-44, 398 A.2d 882, 886-87 (1979); Jackson v.
Pillsbury, 380 Ill. 554, 576, 44 N.E.2d 537, 547 (1942).
" See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub
nom. Garner v. First Am. Life Ins. Co., 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (shareholders in derivative and
class action against corporation); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 585-87 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (Secretary of Labor in civil enforcement action against managers of employee pension
funds); In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 606-08 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (buyers and
sellers of corporation's stock in class action against corporation); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg.
Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (minority shareholders in derivative, class,
and antitrust action against corporation and directors); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80
F.R.D. 718, 722-24 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (shareholders in class action against corporation, directors,
and officers); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (purchasers of stock
in class action against corporation); In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78
F.R.D. 692, 694-98 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (minority shareholders in class action against majority
shareholder); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,894 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (debenture holders in class action against corporation);
Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 366-70 (D. Del. 1975) (minority shareholders in class
action against majority shareholder); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 212-15
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (minority shareholder in purchased company in breach of contract action
against purchaser).
90 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Garner v. First Am. Life Ins. Co.,
401 U.S. 974 (1971).
" See id. at 1100-04. In Garner, minority shareholders of a life insurance company
brought a class action alleging violations of various federal and state securities laws and
common law fraud. Id. at 1095. The plaintiff shareholders sought to recover the price they
had paid for stock in the company, naming as defendants various directors, officers, and con-
trolling persons in the company. Id. In addition, the stockholders brought a derivative ac-
tion on behalf of the company against the various defendants. Id. The company asserted the
attorney-client privilege during the plaintiffs' deposition of the attorney who handled the
allegedly fraudulent stock issuance for the company. Id. at 1095-96. The district court held
that a corporation has no right to assert the privilege against stockholders when the
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the benefit of the shareholders.9" Therefore, the Garner court concluded
that when shareholders bring suit alleging that the corporation has
acted adversely to the shareholders' interests, the courts should balance
the corporation's right to assert the attorney-client privilege against the
shareholders' good cause reasons for piercing the corporation's
privilege.93
Subsequent to Garner, courts have extended the availability of the
balance test to other situations where a discovering party could claim
breach of a fiduciary duty by the corporation resisting discovery.94 Thus,
a federal court has allowed stock purchasers9 5 and debenture holders" to
shareholders bring an action alleging that the corporation and its officers and directors have
engaged in wrongdoing. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (N.D. Ala.
1968), vacated and remanded, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court and held that the corporation had a
qualified right to assert the privilege, subject to the capacity of the plaintiff shareholders to
show good cause. See 430 F.2d at 1103-04.
See 430 F.2d at 1101-04.
9 See id. In Garner, the Fifth Circuit provided a list of nine guidelines that a court
should consider in weighing whether the shareholders have shown good cause in a par-
ticular case. Id. at 1104. The nine indicia of good cause are as follows:
(1) the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they represent;
(2) the bona fides of the shareholders;
(3) the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously colorable;
(4) the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the informa-
tion and the availability of it from other sources;
(5) whether, if the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it
is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality;
(6) whether the communication related to past or to prospective actions;
(7) whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself;
(8) the extent to which the communication is identified versus the extent to which
the shareholders are blindly fishing;
(9) the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information in whose confident-
iality the corporation has an interest for independent reasons.
Id. Commentators have criticized the Garner court for not indicating how the courts are to
weigh the nine factors in a given case. See Herzel & Hagan, Do Corporations Really Have
An Attorney-Client Privilege?, 59 CI. B. REC. 296, 297 (1978); O'Neal, supra note 33, at
1782; Shareholder Litigation, supra note 64, at 316, 322-23. One commentator has predicted
that in the future courts employing the Garner good cause test will require shareholders
merely to show "substantial need" for the evidence. See Shareholder Litigation, supra note
64, at 322-24. At least to date, however, some courts have denied shareholders privileged in-
formation based on one or more of the nine good cause indicia proposed in Garner. See In re
LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 608 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (communication concerned
the litigation itself and could be obtained from other sources); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co.
v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (communication concerned the litigation itself,
plaintiff shareholders held small percentage of stock, and plaintiff shareholders could use in-
formation obtained in derivative action in subsequent individual suits); Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (communication concerned the litigation
itself).
" See note 89 supra (case list).
"5 See Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
" See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,894 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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prove good cause in class actions against corporations. In addition,
courts have permitted minority shareholders to pierce for good cause
the attorney-client privilege of a corporation's majority shareholder.91
One court, however, has refused to apply the balance test where several
participants in a contractual joint venture sought to pierce the privilege
of one of the co-participants. 8 The court reasoned that the participants
only shared a contractual and not a fiduciary relationship?9
The recent case of Donovan v. Fitzsimmons.. represents the most
expansive reading of Garner to date and may provide analogous support
for the good cause dicta in Gulf & Western.1 ' In Donovan, the Secretary
of Labor (Secretary) during pre-trial discovery sought the records of the
Central States, Southeast, and Southwest Areas Pension Funds (Pension
Fund)."°2 The Secretary was seeking evidence that certain Pension Fund
officials had violated their fiduciary obligations to Pension Fund
beneficiaries by engaging in questionable investment transactions."3
The Secretary brought the action under a provision in the Employees
Retirement Income Security Act of 1975 (ERISA) that permits the
Secretary to seek appropriate civil relief when pension fund fiduciaries
violate their duties.' In response to the Pension Fund's assertion of the
attorney-client privilege, the Secretary argued that under the Garner ra-
tionale the Court should allow the Secretary to demonstrate good cause
reasons for piercing the Pension Fund's privilege.",'
The Donovan court held that the Garner good cause exception
should apply when a beneficiary brings charges of fiduciary misconduct
against pension fund trustees. ' Moreover, the court held that the
' See In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692, 695-97 (N.D.
Ill. 1978); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 366-70 (D. Del. 1975); Bailey v. Meister
Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 212-15 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
00 See In re Colocotronis Tanker Securities Litigation, 449 F. Supp. 828, 832-34
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
See id. at 833.
'0 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
10, See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
102 See 90 F.R.D. at 584.
103 See id. The Donovan court did not specify the nature of the investment transactions
giving rise to the civil action. See id. 584-88.
.0. See id. at 583-85. In Donovan, the Secretary of Labor brought suit under § 1132(a) of
the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1975 (ERISA). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1976).
Section 1132(a) allows the Secretary of Labor to bring a civil action for appropriate relief for
violations of § 1109. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Under § 1109, a pension fund trustee personally
is liable for any breach of a fiduciary duty defined in the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1976).
,"5 See 90 F.R.D. at 585. In Donovan, the Pension Fund argued, without citing support-
ing authority, that Garner was a poorly reasoned opinion that the Donovan court should re-
ject. Id. at 585-86. The Pension Fund also argued that under the Garner rationale, only the
beneficiaries, and not the Secretary of Labor, may invoke the good cause exception. Id.
"08 See id. at 586. The Donovan court reasoned that pension fund trustees, like cor-
porate managers, exercise authority for the benefit of their beneficiaries. Id. Similarly, pen-
sion fund beneficiaries, like corporate stockholders, may need privileged information to
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Secretary of Labor may invoke the good cause exception in 'his own
capacity when bringing a civil suit under ERISA specifically on behalf of
the pension fund's beneficiaries."7 Applying the Garner good cause in-
dicia to the facts in Donovan, the court rejected the Pension Fund's
privilege claim.08
Significantly, Donovan is the first case in the Garner tradition that
has permitted a government agency to stand in the shoes of private
beneficiaries and assert the good cause exception against managerial
fiduciaries. Given Donovan, the other good cause cases, and the Gulf &
Western dicta, the SEC conceivably will argue for the good cause excep-
tion in the near future."9 The courts, however, should reject the SEC's
arguments. The SEC is unable to demonstrate either directly or indirectly
the fiduciary-beneficiary link that the good cause cases have required.
No court, for example, yet has held that a fiduciary-beneficiary relation-
ship exists between corporations and the SEC."' Furthermore, Congress
never has granted the SEC special rights to sue on behalf of corporate
stockholders to enforce fiduciary duties owed by the corporation to the
stockholders."'
Since the SEC cannot demonstrate a fiduciary link, the Commission
may attempt to justify a right to invoke the good cause exception on
alternative grounds. The SEC could argue that the courts should allow
the Commission to invoke the good cause exception whenever the Com-
mission can demonstrate an "affinity of interest" with the shareholders
of the corporate defendant. As precedent, the SEC could refer to
determine if the trustees are fulfilling their fiduciary duties. Id. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the Garner rule applies to the pension fund setting. Id.
"' See id. at 586. The Donovan court noted that Congress gave the Secretary of Labor
specific authority to sue on behalf of pension fund beneficiaries in ERISA. See id.; supra
note 104 (discussion of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)). The Donovan court held that as long as
the Secretary was pursuing the specific interests of the pension fund beneficiaries, and not
broader public interests, sufficient identity of interest existed for the Secretary to invoke
the Garner exception. 90 F.R.D. at 586-87.
"' See 90 F.R.D. at 587. In reviewing the Garner good cause criteria, the Donovan
court noted that the following facts contributed to a finding of good cause:
(1) The Secretary of Labor sought restitution of benefits for all potential Pension
Fund beneficiaries;
(2) The Secretary sought records not pertaining to the Pension Fund's litigation
strategy;
(3) The Secretary made the discovery request in good faith and was not engaged
in a fishing expedition;
(4) The Secretary's claim was colorable;
(5) The Secretary's request was limited in scope and directly related to the issues
in the suit.
Id.; supra note 93 (discussion of Garner good cause test).
"I See Vilkin, supra note 11, at 3. John Fedders, the current enforcement chief at the
SEC, has stated that he is considering judicially testing the Gulf & Western dicta in the
near future. Id.
"' See Myers, supra note 64, at 1125.
' Cf. Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 583-85 (N.D. Ill. 1981); supra note 104.
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Donovan, where the court stressed that the Secretary of Labor may in-
voke the good cause exception only when pursuing the particular in-
terests of the pension fund's beneficiaries and not broader public in-
terests."2 If the courts accept the "affinity of interest" test as a
substitute for the traditional fiduciary link requirement, then the courts
will face the problematic task of determining when the SEC is suing a
corporation to protect the particular interests of the corporation's
shareholders rather than suing to enforce the federal securities laws in
general. Alternatively, the courts could abandon the narrow limits im-
posed by Garner, Donovan, and the other good cause cases and adopt the
broad public interest rationale suggested in Gulf & Western."' If the
courts adopt the public interest rationale, then in every case where the
SEC could show a good faith need for confidential attorney-client com-
munications, presumably the corporation's privilege would yield."'
If, however, the courts permit the SEC to invoke a good cause excep-
tion to the traditional attorney-client privilege, under either the affinity
of interest or the public interest rationale, troublesome new issues will
arise. For example, other federal agencies may claim the same right to
the exception that the SEC would possess. Arguably, the courts either
will have to extend the good cause exception to all government agencies
or will have to develop a justification for discriminating among public
agencies." If the courts were to limit the good cause exception to par-
ticular agencies, then the courts additionally must decide whether
112 See note 107 supra.
II See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
1 See Pickholz, supra note 11, at 17.
See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). An issue in Per-
mian was whether public policy reasons existed for allowing the SEC to receive privileged
information that would not be available to other government agencies. See id. at 1221-22.
Although Permian deals with waiver of the attorney-client privilege, rather than possible
exceptions to the privilege, the court's public policy observations are relevant to the issue
of whether a basis exists for discriminating among government agencies.
In Permian, a corporation disclosed privileged information to the SEC for the purpose
of expediting approval of a registration statement that the corporation needed for a proposed
stock exchange with another corporation. Id. at 1216. When the SEC decided to share some
of the information with the Department of Energy, the corporation sought a court order to
prevent the disclosure. Id. at 1217. The corporation claimed that under the limited waiver
theory of Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977), a voluntary
disclosure of privileged information to the SEC did not preclude the corporation from
asserting the privilege against other government agencies. 665 F.2d at 1219-21. The Per-
mian court rejected the corporation's argument and held that a voluntary disclosure to one
government agency is a waiver of the privilege as against all other agencies. Id. at 1221-22.
The Permian court observed that neither Congress nor the courts had established a priority
system that placed greater value on cooperation with the SEC than on cooperation with
other regulatory agencies. Id. Therefore, no basis existed for allowing corporations to
release privileged information to the SEC while refusing to release the information to other
agencies. Id. By similar logic, if the courts permit the SEC a good cause exception to the




government agencies that obtain confidential communications under the
exception may share the communications with government agencies or
private parties that do not qualify for the exception and cannot obtain
the communications under the traditional attorney-client privilege.
The Gulf & Western dicta may be a significant judicial step toward a
general abandonment of the traditional approach to the attorney-client
privilege in favor of the alternative balance test approach.116 Whether
the courts adopt an affinity of interest or a broad public interest
justification for permitting some or all government agencies to invoke
the good cause exception, the effect will be to increase dramatically the
uncertainty corporations face in determining whether the attorney-
client privilege protects confidential communications. Moreover, if other
courts demonstrate Gulf & Western's tolerance for questionable SEC in-
vestigatory practices, the privilege will be weakened further.'17 The bet-
ter course is to retain the traditional privilege where a fiduciary rela-
tionship does not exist and to react critically to the type of investigation
the SEC conducted in Gulf & Western. Otherwise, the courts may as
well abandon the attorney-client privilege entirely in the corporate con-
text since, as the Supreme Court recently stated: "An uncertain
privilege ... is little better than no privilege at all.' 18
D. STAN BARNHILL
11 See text accompanying notes 76-87 supra (discussion of traditional and balance test
approaches to attorney-client privilege).
"'See text accompanying notes 19-24, 52-59 supra (discussion of SEC's investigatory
practices).
"' See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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